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ABSTRACT. Following the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, Indonesia became one of the countries that 
adopted presidential government system in which the president is directly elected by the people. The interesting 
thing that is still hitherto controversial is the limitation of presidential term of office for no more than two periods. 
Our review of various literatures illustrates that there is no standard exemplar to limit or not to limit the period 
that must be applied in a country that adheres to presidentialism. Furthermore, if it is associated with democracy, 
the limitation of presidential period will cause contradiction especially with president’s accountability in which 
the president is directly elected by the people. Based on this, we conducted a study using qualitative method with 
historiography approach that aims at knowing how the periodisation of presidential term of office in Indonesia 
viewed from a democratic perspective. This article argues that the model of presidential period limitation for at 
maximum two periods must be carried out by adding the length of service to more than five years and requiring 
an interlude between the first and the second period. The modelling can anticipate the tendency of power abuse 
by incumbent while maintaining people’s support for the legitimacy of the president. 
Keyword: constitution; democracy; limiting power; periodisation; presidentialism.
ABSTRAK. Pasca amandemen UUD 1945, Indonesia menjadi salah satu negara yang menganut sistem 
pemerintahan presidensial yang mana pengisian jabatan presiden dilakukan melalui pemilihan langsung oleh 
rakyat. Hal yang menarik yang hingga kini masih kontroversial dari amandemen tersebut adalah pembatasan 
kekuasaan presiden selama tidak lebih dari dua periode. Tinjauan terhadap berbagai literatur memberikan 
gambaran bahwa perlu atau tidaknya kekuasaan tersebut dibatasi berdasarkan periodisasi bukanlah suatu 
ketentuan baku yang harus diberlakukan dalam suatu negara yang menganut sistem pemerintahan presidensial. 
Di sisi lain, Jika dikaitkan dengan demokrasi adanya pembatasan kekuasaan presiden secara periodisasi akan 
menimbulkan pertentangan terutama dengan pertanggungjawaban politik presiden pada saat presiden dipilih 
langsung oleh rakyat. Berdasarkan hal tersebut, penulis melakukan kajian melalui metode kualitatif dengan 
pendekatan historiografi dengan tujuan untuk mengetahui bagaimana periodisasi kekuasaan presiden di 
Indonesia dilihat dari perspektif demokrasi. Artikel ini berargumen bahwa model pembatasan masa jabatan 
presiden selama dua periode harus dilakukan dengan catatan menambah tahun masa jabatan lebih dari lima 
tahun dan terdapat masa jeda jabatan antara periode pertama dengan periode kedua. Pemodelan tersebut dapat 
mengantisipasi kecenderungan penyalahgunaan kekuasaan oleh calon petahana sekaligus menjaga dukungan 
demos terhadap legitimasi presiden. 
Kata kunci: konstitusi; demokrasi; pembatasan kekuasaan; periodisasi; presidensialisme.
INTRODUCTION
Since the fourth amendment of 1945 
Constitution, many experts stated that the 
government system adopted by Indonesia was a 
pure presidentialism (Radjab in Ghoffar, 2009). 
One of the assumptions is based on the way that 
the presidential position is elected directly by the 
people. Before the amendment, the presidential 
position was elected by the People’s Consultative 
Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
or MPR) as the highest state institution. One of 
the authority held by MPR at that time was to 
elect president and vice president. Therefore, the 
government system in Indonesia was considered 
to be not purely presidentialism (mixed). This 
way of election tended to represent parliamentary 
characteristics to which the president chosen by 
MPR must submit, obey and be responsible to 
the institution as it happened in parliamentary 
system.
Although at that time MPR had a strong 
position, in reality its power construction did not 
appear as such. During the Old and New Order, 
MPR was under the shadow of the president’s 
power. During the Old Order, for example, the 
Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly 
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara or 
MPRS) issued a Decree of MPRS No. III/ MPRS/ 
1963 regarding the appointment of President 
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Sukarno to be the Great Leader of Indonesia 
Revolution and it allowed him to become a 
lifelong President of Republic of Indonesia. 
Whereas during the New Order period, MPR 
was unable to create opportunity for (an) other 
presidential candidate besides President Suharto. 
The MPR’s incapacity towards president both 
in the Old and the New Order was due to the 
strong power of the president, especially in 
determining the position of MPR members. 
MPR members became dependent on the will of 
the president and were unable to exercise their 
power optimally.
From the description above, we conclude 
that the political changes in electing presidential 
position which was originally by the MPR to be 
directly elected by people is not necessarily to 
realise the pure presidential government system 
in Indonesia. Substantially, these changes are 
based on the historical roots of Indonesian 
politics, both in the Old and the New Order, 
which in fact had constructed president’s power 
to be stronger than that of MPR as the institution 
who inaugurated him.
Another interesting change stipulated in the 
amended 1945 Constitution is the limitation of 
presidential period of office through a periodisation 
of maximum two periods. Previously, the original 
1945 Constitution did not explicitly state the 
period length of the president and only stated that 
the president was elected every five years and 
after that he could be re-elected for the same term 
of office. In practice, this provision was used by 
the New Order Regime to perpetuate its power for 
more than six periods (32 years) consecutively. 
The emergence of restrictions on the periodisation 
of presidential power into two periods in the 
amendment is considered a powerful mechanism 
to prevent the power to be held too long by 
someone who can potentially create a tyranny.
Although the provision was considered 
to be part of the presidential period limitation, 
we consider that limiting presidential period in 
Indonesia through periodisation was not based on 
the root of the problems that actually occurred in 
Indonesia. Many opinions state that the contents 
of the amendments were strongly influenced 
by the presidential government system of the 
United States. The presidential term of office 
which is limited to only two periods is similar 
to those applied in the government system in 
the US. In fact, if we compare the history of the 
periodisation of presidential office in the US and 
Indonesia, there actually appear differences, both 
in history and background. The limitation of 
period in the US was initiated by a constitutional 
convention based on the refusal of the first 
President of the US, George Washington, to 
become president for the third time. The rejection 
was because he considered that government that 
lasted too long would give someone too much 
power. While in Indonesia, the period limitation 
is often associated with political trauma of the 
New Order regime. Another difference between 
the US and Indonesia is that the presidential 
election in the US is carried out directly by the 
people, while in Indonesia it was carried out by 
MPR.
Thus, when Indonesia now is implementing 
presidential election directly by the people, 
there is absolutely no relevance at all between 
the historical background and the issuance of 
provisions that the presidential office is limited 
to only two periods. The periodisation also tends 
to conflict with the democracy principle which 
gives freedom to people to determine political 
condition within the country. Even in the US, 
the application of this model has been a debate. 
President Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower 
and Ronald Reagan, for instance, argued that 
the maximum limitation of two periods of 
presidential position was contrary to people’s 
freedom to choose the president they wanted 
(Indrayana, 2014). 
In the context of Indonesian politics, there 
are some previous studies which are relevant to 
this research. A study conducted by Yudhistira 
(2020) entitled “Limitation of the Presidential 
Term as an Effort to Avoid Abuse of Power”, 
for instance, uses a statutory approach, a his-
torical approach and a conceptual approach. 
The background of his study begins with the 
possibility of the abuse of authority and the 
emergence of authoritarianism in all countries 
that recognize presidentialism. The result of the 
study shows that the 20 countries that adhere to 
the presidential system most widely use the Only 
One Re-election and/or No Re-election system. 
This because these systems are considered to be 
able to easily limit the presidential term of office 
and also can determine the fixed government 
so that the possibility to abuse power can be 
minimised. Meanwhile, the No Immediate Re-
election and No Limitation Election system are 
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used by a country that allows its president to rule 
for a long time without any restrictions to run 
for president so that the possibility of abuse of 
power might occurs.
Another research that is also related to this 
research is a study conducted by Efriza (2016) 
that concludes that the theoretical assumption 
of Mainwaring and Piliang is proven in this 
study, by looking at the fact of the tension in the 
power relations between the President and the 
Indonesian Parliamentary (DPR), which is caused 
by a combination of presidential and multi-party 
system. Deadlocks or even hung parliamentary 
did not occur during Susilo Bambang Yudoyono 
(SBY)’s administration and Joko Widodo 
(Jokowi)’s administration, and even it could 
not be categorized as problematic because there 
was no conflict between the two institutions but 
only political tension caused by differences of 
opinion and due to the roles and the function of 
the DPR in supervising the executive. According 
to him, this can happen due to: 1) the style of 
governing of the President tends to be politically 
accommodative; 2) weak party institutions and 
tendencies to be pragmatic make political parties 
use nomadism as a political strategy, and it leads 
to the formation of power cartelisation; and 3) 
there is a mechanism for mutual consent and 
periodic consultation between the President 
and the DPR regarding the construction of the 
constitution and legislation which can break the 
deadlock.
Based on the above background, we 
can distinguish that this study does not only 
compare the construction of restrictions on 
presidential power in each country, but also 
examines how the ideal model of limiting 
power in the presidential government system in 
Indonesia is based on political and democratic 
developments in Indonesia, especially after the 
amended 1945 Constitution. In doing so, we 
seek to examine the periodisation on presidential 
office in Indonesia using historiography that 
is based on political history in Indonesia from 
a democratic perspective. The results of this 
study are also expected to be useful to add the 
reference of teaching materials and scientific 
research, especially in the subjects of constitution 
and democratic studies. Practically, this research 
is expected to be able to contribute specifically 
related to institutional development and demo-
cracy in Indonesia. This study was carried 
out descriptively with the aim to find out the 
history of limiting presidential authority through 
periodisation of power in Indonesia, how it is put 
into practice, how it is viewed from a democratic 
perspective, and how the ideal model of power 
limitation in government system in Indonesia 
based on its development of democracy.
METHOD
We used qualitative approach in examining 
how the periodisation of presidential office in 
Indonesia by using historiography approach. 
The reason for using this approach is because 
this topic is a phenomenon which is not widely 
known and is considered to be a unique and 
specific case that occurred in the past. To 
obtain the required data, the research used 
descriptive-analysis method which is to describe 
complex social reality through simplification 
and classification by utilizing concepts that 
can explain a social phenomenon analytically 
(Vredenbregt, 1983). In doing the field research, 
we used historiography method to deepen the 
case which happened in the past. Similar to 
study case method, the research focused on 
specific and unique case to obtain a more detail 
information and to undertand the related general 
topic.
The data source was divided into two, 
which were primary and secondary data 
sources. Primary data was obtained directly and/
or through interviews with informants while 
secondary data was a written source which is 
obtained from books, scientific magazines, 
archival data sources, and official documents 
captured through literature. The data was 
collected through as follows:
1. Literature study, which was done by 
searching for written sources, such as books, 
press reports, various opinions and analysis 
on them, and other documents related to the 
research phenomenon
2. In-depth interviews with informants who 
were able to provide extensive and in-
depth information about the objects studied, 
especially the academics. Informants were 
selected according to the data needs without 
any number of restrictions as stated by 
Neuman (2015) that the adequacy of the 
data was achieved when sufficient data 
was collected so that there was saturation. 
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Interviews with informants were carried 
out using interview guideline that had been 
prepared in advance.
Data and information collected by various 
instruments will become raw data. Not all raw 
data were transferred to the research report, but 
rather they were selectively organised, sorted, 
managed and synthesised. So the data obtained 
in the field as “raw” material can be reduced 
and arranged more systematically so that the 
findings and the discussions are easier to control. 
To check data validity, we used triangulation 
whose technique uses other source outside the 
data for checking purposes or as a comparison 
to the data. Triangulation with sources means 
comparing and checking the degree of trust in 
information obtained through time and different 
tools in qualitative research (Maleong, 2006).
Constitution and Presidensialism
Both political scientists and constitutional 
law experts commonly agree that the clasifications 
of constitution which are credible to determine a 
political system in a country can be divided into 
two systems, i.e., presidetialism and parliamentary. 
These clasifications, nevertheless, are not only 
limited by the two mentioned systems, in many 
cases, there are also practices that combine and 
intersect between both of them, such as semi-
presidentialism and semi-parliamentary. To 
discuss more deeply, in parliamentary system, 
the government has some central traits in which 
it has two executive institutions, which are the 
executive who runs and holds responsible for the 
governmental administration, and the executive 
who does not. The former is led by the cabinet 
or ministers, while the latter is led by the head of 
state, such as a king for a kingdom or a president 
for a republic. The accountability of the latter 
executive is held by the former executive. Thus, 
there are two concepts of the executive whereby 
‘the real executive’ is the executive who runs 
and holds responsible for the governmental 
administration and ‘the nominal executive’ is the 
executive who does not.
Furthermore, in a parliamentary system, the 
cabinet or the ministers hold responsible to the 
head of the house, while the head of state does not. 
It means that the real executive can be impeached 
by the house. In practice, there are various systems 
of parliamentary, such as monarchy parliamentary 
and republic parliamentary. There is also a 
parliamentary system in which its ministers are 
forbidden to be members of parliament like 
in Netherland. On the other hand, the British 
parliamentary system requires ministers as 
members of parliament (ex-officio). We can also 
find federal parliamentary system such as in India, 
Canada and Malaysia, and unitary parliamentary 
systems such as in Singapore and Italy.
Meanwhile, presidentialism system only 
uses an executive in which the function of head 
of government (chief executive) and head of 
state are hold by one hand and one person (single 
executive). The executive in presidentialism 
does not hold responsible to the house but to 
the people who has directly elected him or her 
through, for instance, electoral college in the US 
(Manan, 1999). 
After the amendment of the 1945 
Constitution, many scholars argue that Indonesia 
has applied a pure presidential system. One of 
them is Dasril Radjab (2005) who points out 
several reasons of the argument, which are:
a. The president is a head and at the same time a 
head of government who leads and executes 
daily administration.
b. The president and the vice president are 
directly elected by the people, thus they don 
not hold responsible to the house (parliament).
c. The president and the house are institutionally 
equal so the president does not have an 
authority to dismiss the parliament.
d. The president appoints and dismisses 
ministers.
e. The president completes his or her duties and 
authorities for five years or in a certain fixed 
term which is regulated by the constitution.
As for the focus of this research, the 
regulations that limits the length of presidential 
office have been basically clear, both theoretically 
and normatively. A contitution determines that 
the power of a president depends on the people 
who elected him or her. A president’s authority 
is also limited by a fixed term regulated by the 
constitution (whether four years or five years). 
Moreover, commonly in the countries that apply 
pure presidentialism, their parliament can limits 
president’s authority by controlling the execution 
of government led by the president.  
An interesting thing in presidentialism 
is that president’s authority is also limited by 
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a democratic system called ‘periodisation’ of 
presidential term of office. Similar to the US or 
in Indonesia, a president and a vice president can 
only take the office at maximum two periods 
and cannot be nominated and elected anymore. 
According to the theoretical debate on limiting 
presidenttial term of office, there is no credible 
argument stating that a presidential term of office 
in a presidential system must be limited, whether 
at maximum once or twice. Notwithstanding, 
if we look at the history of periodisation of 
presidential term of office, it can be tracked from 
the US’ history when at the beginning it started 
from an unwritten convension. 
There are some constitutional convensions 
in the US, such as the political party system and 
the mechanism of electing president and vice 
president through party’s convension. In the 
1787 Constitution of the US, president and vice 
president take office for four years, and there is no 
regulation about the limitation of term of office 
that a president can be re-elected. It was firstly 
initiated when George Washington, the first US 
President, refused his nomination for the third 
time to the office because it contradicted with the 
democratic government that he aspired. Since 
then, there were nobody from the next presidents 
who nominated himself for the third period. 
This unwritten habit made every US President 
limits their term of office at maximum twice 
consecutively. Nevertheless, this convension 
was trespassed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
who was elected four times sequently (1932, 
1936, 1940 and 1944). Since the convension 
was broken, the idea to regulate in write the 
limitation of presidential term of office emerged, 
which was stated in the Amendment XXII in 
1951. In the amended constitution, presidential 
term of office is regulated at maximum two 
periods sequently (Ruyanti, 2009). Through 
this amendment, it can be said that the efforts 
to limit presidential term of office was derived 
from a political convension, specifically in the 
US and did not necessarily become a central 
characteristic of presidentialism. 
Critiques on Liberal Democracy and Efforts 
to Control the Elites
The main idea in limiting president’s 
power is basically influenced by the emergence 
of critiques from democrats on the practice of 
liberal democracy and the fear of the emergence 
of elites who cannot be controlled by the people 
(Good, 2003). This because in presidentialism, 
president’s power is directly sourced from the 
people, whereby the parliament stands equally 
with the executive in functioning control. 
Legitimacy that is directly gained makes a 
president is always seen as a representation of 
power for the people, so he or she can takes control 
and executes the governmental administrations. 
One of the most important critiques from 
democrats on the practice of liberal democracy 
is that how the presidential system, under the 
democratic regime, can regulate president’s 
accountability who has a powerful legilimacy. If 
a presidential term of office is not limited, one 
could say, a person (or elites) can controls and 
dominates a whole country, as Good puts in:
Three groups of ‘insider’ were highly 
advantaged: the very rich, who can finance 
their own costly campaigns; ‘legacies’ or 
‘inheritors’, such as the sons or wives of 
presidents; and incumbents, who can exchange 
the power of their office for campaign 
contributions (2003: 156).
Therefore, in order to create a better 
accountability of a president, it needs efforts from 
the people to control the elites so the country 
will never be trapped by any authoritarian 
regime. This not to deny that in the political 
realm there will always be political elites who 
control resources, power or social class, but it is 
still necessary to create a government which can 
prevent an unfair relation that only advantages 
the elites and omitting the control of the people 
(Good, 2003). In the context of the US, hence, 
there is no special law in the constitution that 
gives privilege to president and vice president 
for having a lower accountability from the other 
citizens (Horowitz, 2001). Thus, models of 
constitution that enables the idea of periodisation 
and re-election can be an effective political 
instrument to examine public’s consent and 
president’s accountability at the same time. 
The idea of limiting presidential term of 
office emerged as a critique of Juan Linz on 
presidentialism arose, in which, for him, the 
presidential system tends to be unstable compared 
to parliamentary system (Mainwaring & Shugart, 
1997). On of the deficiencies of presidentialism, 
according to Linz, is that the fixed term owned 
by president is seen to be static and, hence, not 
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compatible with the nature of democracy that 
needs flexibility and accountability. Thus, in 
presidential system, the process of re-election 
is always negatively seen since it is prone to be 
abused by incumbent president who utilise his 
or her power within the fixed term. This can be 
proven in various young-democratic countries, 
where president has authority, the more the 
government has conflict potential.
Even though, Linz’s critique on 
presidentialism was refuted by Mainwaring 
and Shugart (1997) who argue that presidential 
system which applies fixed term gives 
accountability higher than that of parliamentary 
system, since the voters can consider president’s 
performance in a clear measure of time (fixed 
term), thus, in the perspective of participatory 
democracy, the people can evaluate the extent 
to which a government’s success through the 
process of re-election: if he or she is eligible 
enough for re-election or not. Though there are 
some negative perspectives and pessimism on 
presidentialism, such as Linz’s critique earlier, 
the process of re-election in presidential system 
can be seen as a control mechanism on the 
executive’s accountability to the people.
Constitutional Dilemma in Democratic 
Perspective
Seen in the light of democratic point of view, 
limiting president’s term of office can potentially 
cause some problems. Using the idea of ‘general 
will’ conceived by Rousseau, the amendment of 
the 1945 Constitution held by a few of political 
elites at the beginning of democratisation 1998 
in Indonesia can be seen as an instrument in 
which, to some extent, contradicts with the will 
of people. For Rousseau, individuals should be 
involved directly in formulating law, including 
the constitution, whereby they themselves are 
bound and regulated. As he points out, ‘the ruled 
should be the rulers’ (in Held, 2006: 45). Given 
this theoretical framework, hence, constitution 
or law products should represent involvement 
and will of people generally. In Rousseau’s 
concept it is called ‘general will’, which is 
conceived as general concept of common good 
(Rousseau, 1968). In understanding the concept 
of general will, it is necessary to note that this 
concept is incomparable with ‘will of all’. The 
concept of general will is also uncomparable 
with aggregative mechanism in the electoral 
system since it much more focuses on creating 
constitutions or law that is obtained through 
common consensus and common good 
(Rousseau, 1968).
In achieving ‘general will’, it is important to 
consider, what Rousseau calls, ‘super-majority’ 
in the people, which the justification of common 
good is gained in the majority with full agreement 
(Schwartzberg, 2008). If the constitution is 
no based on general will, the consensus does 
not have a strong legitimacy. Vice versa, if the 
constitution is based on general will, any result 
of an election can be seen compatible to the will 
of people. Therefore, it is important to analyse 
and examine, whether the members of MPR 
in 1999 who amended the 1945 Constitution, 
especially in Article 7 on limiting president’s 
term of office was based on general will, and not 
only on political traumatism of political elites on 
the Old or New Order’s authoritarianism.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Polemic on the Revision of Article 7 in the 
First Amendment of the 1945 Constitution 
in 1999
Historically, efforts on limiting president’s 
term of office through periodisation started by 
revising Article 7 in the first amendment of the 
1945 Constitution in 1999. The revision on this 
article explixitly regulated president and vice 
president’s term of office and limited it only a 
change to be re-elected. Based on the research 
in Risalah Perubahan UUD 1945 MPR RI 
(Minutes of Assembly on the Amendment of the 
1945 Constitution held by the MPR Republic 
of Indonesia), especially on the Meeting of Ad 
Hoc Committee III Badan Pekerja MPR RI on 
7th of October 1999, there are some reasons that 
caused the amendment on that article.
Firstly, the initiative began as one of the 
representative of the Love Nation Democracy 
Faction (Fraksi-Demorkasi Kasih Bangsa or 
F-PDKB), Gregorius Seto Harianto (Risalah, 
1999a: 45), discussed that changes to Article 
7 were mandated by the MPR Republic of 
Indonesia Decree XIII/ 1998 concerning the 
Limiting of President and Vice President’s 
Term of Office. This argument further saw that 
the limitation of presidential power is a legal 
implication of the existence of the MPR Decree, 
and therefore the agenda needed to be included 
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in the substance of the first amendment to the 
Indonesian constitution.
Secondly, the limitation of the term of 
office of the president and vice president was 
also due to the views in the Ad Hoc Committee 
III meeting which considered that the 1945 
Constitution was too heavy executive so that 
the constitution too gave the president almost 
absolute power and negated the role of other state 
institutions, in particular viewed in trias politica 
approach, namely parliament and the Supreme 
Court. The same thing was stated by Surya 
Darma Ali and Chodijah H. M. Soleh (Risalah, 
1999a: 138) as representatives of the Unity and 
Development Faction (Fraksi-Persatuan dan 
Pembangunan or F-PPP) who stated that the 
1945 Constitution (pre-amendment) had given 
absolute power to the president as the executor 
of power so it has twice given birth two dictator-
authoritarian leaders (Sukarno and Suharto). The 
power of the president who was not limited by 
the pre-amended 1945 Constitution was proven 
to be easily deviated by the holders of power. 
For instance, the abuse of power occurred 
when the Presidential Decree Sukarno issued 
in 1959 which could dissolve Konstituante (the 
Constituent Assembly), implemented Guided 
Democracy and made Sukarno the President 
for life. Mischief was also occurred in the New 
Order era when Soeharto was always elected 
President for 32 years even though procedurally 
and formally the general election had been 
implemented.
Third, the heavy executive view was 
also reinforced by the viewpoint of Patrialis 
Akbar (Risalah, 1999a: 72) of the Reformation 
Faction (Fraksi Reformasi) which stated that 
the presidential term limitation can be seen 
as a starting point for re-functioning and 
strengthening other state institutions in trias 
politica to check and balance and the mechanism 
of control and supervision of executive power. 
Considering the pre-amendment of the 1945 
Constitution tended to strengthen the executive 
and weakened the legislature, the revision of 
Article 7 could limit the power of the president 
and strengthen the legislature in accordance 
with its main tasks and functions. Thus, the 
demand for democratisation and also the 
political dynamics that occured in the people 
could be in line with the amendment agenda to 
create a truly democratic climate.
However, there were polemics and differing 
interpretations of the Decision of MPR XIII/ 1998 
concerning the Limiting on the Term of Office of 
the President and Vice-President of the Republic 
of Indonesia, both in Ad Hoc Committee III 
meetings and in the Plenary and Lobby meetings 
of the Commission C of the MPR Republic of 
Indonesia, who had duty to discuss the amendment 
of the 1945 Constitution. The question that always 
arose in the meeting, especially from the Groups 
Faction (Fraksi – Utusan Golongan or F-UG), 
was whether the presidential period is limited by 
a maximum of one time election was counted 
consecutively or could be intermittent. In the 
discussion, there were at least two interpretations. 
On one hand, the president and vice president can 
be re-elected for one period either consecutively 
or intermittently and maximally only have 
power for two periods. Meaning that after each 
of them has exercised power for two periods 
then they cannot be chosen for the same position 
afterwards forever. However, on the other hand, 
the interpretation of the Decision of MPR XIII/ 
1998 can be understood that the president and 
vice president can be re-elected a maximum 
of one period and allow for re-election with the 
condition that there is a minimum gap of one 
period. These two interpretations were expressed 
by representatives of the Golkar Party Faction 
(Fraksi – Partai Golkar), Slamet Effendy Yusuf, 
at the Ad Hoc Committee III meeting on 9th of 
October 1999.
The emergence of the second alternative 
interpretation of the Decision of MPR XIII/ 
1998 gave rise to debate and polemics during 
the meeting at that time. Interesting things were 
conveyed by Amin Aryoso (Risalah, 1999b: 
204) from the Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle Faction (Fraksi – Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia Perjuangan or FPDIP) which stated 
that the former president or former vice president 
who had been elected for two periods still had 
political rights to be elected as leaders. This is 
mainly considering the quality of the human 
resources they have and the conditions of post-
reform Indonesia that are still in the development 
stage, so that they need stability. However, the 
re-election process without limitation (unlimited 
re-election) is still with the terms and conditions 
a minimum gap of one period.
However, the interpretations that tended to 
advocate for human rights issues and also the 
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demands of demos appeared to be very minor in 
the meeting with the presence of various negative 
responses from all factions. The democratisation 
approach was more influential in the first process 
of amending this constitution. This can be seen 
from the consistent opinion of the majority of 
the factions in MPR who stated that the Decision 
of MPR XIII/ 1998 had a clear interpretation 
that the president and vice president’s term of 
office, in the name of democratisation, were 
limited with maximum re-election for one 
period, either consecutively or intermittently. As 
stated by Khofifah Indar Parawangsa (Risalah, 
1999b: 303), the representative of the National 
Awakening Faction (Fraksi – Kebangkitan 
Bangsa or F-KB), at the Ad Hoc Committee 
III meeting, the presidential period limitation 
of a maximum of two periods could guarantee 
future circulation of elite and appropriate with 
what democracy wants. Therefore, the post-
amendment of the 1945 Constitution must be able 
to demitologise the president and vice president 
as ordinary and not sacred positions. This is in 
line with Hatta Mustofa’s argument (Risalah, 
1999c: 681) from the Golkar Party Faction (F-
PG) that the presidential period limitation is in 
line with the wave of democratization and also 
avoids the historical tendency that unrestricted 
presidential power is based on political 
experience in Indonesia had tendency to torment 
the people.
The Practice of Limiting President’s Power 
through Periodisation in Indonesia
Since the ratification of the first amendment 
of 1945 Constitution on 19th of October 1999, 
formally through the provisions stipulated 
in Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution, the 
president’s power has been limited to only two 
term periods. This provision began to take effect 
since Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) served as 
president in Indonesia. Although the president’s 
power was limited to only two periods, Gus Dur 
in his tenure never held the position of president 
for two periods, even before the first period of 
his power was over, since he was impeached 
by MPR and only had power in less than two 
years. Likewise with his successor Megawati 
Soekarnoputri who took office from 23rd of July 
2001 to 20th of October 2004 did not arrive in two 
periods due to losing the presidential election in 
2004. The practice of limiting president’s power 
through periodisation was only implemented 
during the reign of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(SBY) and Joko Widodo (Jokowi). SBY who 
came to power from 2004 to 2009 subsequently 
was re-elected in 2009 until 2014. SBY could not 
nominate again as President in 2014 because he 
had gone through a term of office for two periods 
as stipulated in the constitution. Meanwhile, 
Jokowi took the presidential office for the second 
period after he was re-elected in 2019 General 
Election.
Nevertheless, there was an interesting 
thing since the enactment of the periodisation of 
presidential power since the presidency of Gus 
Dur until Jokowi. Both Gus Dur and Megawati 
Soekarnoputri came to power through the 
mechanism of elections carried out by MPR. 
Whereas SBY and Jokowi were the President in 
power by being directly elected by the people. 
Both the election model carried out by MPR and 
directly by the people are in principle the same 
that the presidential power in Indonesia can only 
be in power for up to two periods. Even though 
the pattern was equally applied to the different 
presidential electing models, it is worth looking 
at the history of why the presidential position 
in Indonesia must be limited to two periods. 
It was explained earlier that the background 
of the changes made in Article 7 of the 1945 
Constitution was based on a reflection of the 
presidential power that occurred during the 
authoritarian New Order. Suharto, who was 
elected by the MPR since 1967, had been in 
power for 32 years without being able to be 
controlled by other institutions including MPR 
itself. The length of Suharto’s rule gave enough 
time to strengthen his power to become an 
authoritarian regime. This was greatly realised 
by MPR which made changes to Article 7 of the 
1945 Constitution. Provisions stipulated in the 
constitution as referred in Article 7 constitute a 
limitation of the Presidential period as well as 
the power of MPR which at that time still had 
the power to elect and appoint the president. By 
determinating limitation during the two terms 
of office, it is practical that both the president 
and MPR can no longer be elected and elect a 
president who has been in power for two periods.
If we look at the history, after the third 
amendment of the Constitution, the pattern of 
electing the President is no longer chosen and 
appointed by MPR, but directly by the people 
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through the mechanism of election. The direct 
election of president at the same time confirms 
the model of the government system adopted 
by Indonesia, which is pure presidential. 
Direct presidential election also eliminates the 
power of MPR to elect the president. Direct 
presidential election is also always associated 
with the expansion of people’s participation 
in determining political positions as a form of 
strengthening democratic political system. For 
instance, since 2004 this provision has begun 
to be carried out by direct presidential election 
which in that year SBY won. Furthermore, with 
the same mechanism in 2009, the presidential 
election was directly re-implemented and again 
SBY obtained the most votes defeating other 
candidates. Until two periods of his tenure SBY 
finally had to stop his position as president 
and could no longer run again as a presidential 
candidate.
Periodisation of President’s Power in Indonesia 
Viewed from Democratic Perspective
As stated earlier, the presidential system 
does not require that the presidenttial term 
of office must be periodically limited. The 
differences in applying periodisation of 
presidential term in each country are more likely 
to be based on its historical background and 
political development. Some countries such as 
Indonesia and the Philippines use periodisation 
of power as a response to the existence of 
authoritarian regimes that have ruled the country. 
While the US limited the President’s period of 
power due to convention that developed and 
passed down through generations into a political 
habit that was considered good.
Although it is not an absolute requirement 
in presidentialism, many experts argue that 
the provision of limiting president’s power in 
Indonesia through periodisation as stipulated in 
the Constitution is an effort to ensure that power, 
especially the power of the president, does not 
run arbitrarily. Quoting the opinion of Bagir 
Manan, an Indonesian constitutional and state 
law expert, he said:
If we talk conceptually about this, there are 
the practices which are strongly related to 
the principle of limiting power. One function 
of the constitution is to limit the power. 
These restrictions can be of various forms, 
limitation of power, limitation of term of 
office or restrictions with certain conditions 
such as full age and others.
Why do you need restrictions? This goes 
back to the adage of Montesquieu that power 
contains greedy nature so people will just be 
happy to be not replaced and that power has 
a tendency to be misused. If Lord Acton said 
that power has absolute power and before that 
[argued] by Montesquieu that besides power it 
contains greedy nature, experiences indicate 
that anyone in power wants to properly add his 
power so that he could not be controlled [and] 
therefore this limitation is a part of the control 
system (Interview, 2018).
An opinion that is almost the same were 
stated by Nandang Deliarnoor, an Indonesian 
state law expert, who said:
It is important to limit power because if 
there is no limit to that power… [as] it was 
described by Lord Acton, ‘power tends to 
corrupt, absolute power corrupts absolutely’, 
absolute power tends to be completely 
misused. So that is why the term is limited, 
whether it is the president, the Supreme 
Court, the chancellor, the dean should also 
be seen from the idea of limiting his or her 
authority. For example, [when] you make a 
law, you cannot execute and control it at the 
same time, it is like absolute monarchy era. 
Making a law, carrying out the law, it must be 
arbitrary. So, [this is] to keep the abuse from 
happening (Interview, 2018).
Seen from the two opinions above, we 
conclude that the constitutional effort to limit the 
power of the president periodically aims so that 
president’s power within a presidential system is 
not carried out arbitrarily. Power is not static and 
experiences have showed that anyone in power 
wanted to properly add to his power so he or she 
cannot be controlled. In the case of Indonesia, 
before Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution was 
changed, the president who was not restricted 
periodically became an authoritarian ruler. On 
the other hand, when the president is now elected 
directly by the people, then in addition to the 
constitution, the people also have the power to 
determine the nomination of political positions 
including the position of president. People who 
has sovereignty has the right to determine who 
deserves to be president in Indonesia. If studied 
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further, as if there is a conflict between the 
constitution which regulates the periodisation 
of the president’s power and the people’s will 
(general will) in democracy. This is not just an 
assumption, as in the US which is considered 
established in using this pattern, there have 
been criticisms raised by several presidents who 
have ruled the maximum limit of two periods of 
presidential term and it is contrary to people’s 
freedom to elect the president they want.
To find out how far the two contradictions 
are above, Bagir Manan believes that:
There is no conflict between the constitution 
and democracy, precisely this limitation 
provides an opportunity for the people 
to check the government, whether the 
government is still true or not. [Let] people’s 
democracy [work] so that the people [enable 
to] check it. The general election provides an 
opportunity for the people to check or control. 
Like I said, the only way for people to show 
their sovereignty is during general elections. 
Why these restrictions do not conflict with 
democracy? Because democracy provides an 
opportunity for everyone to occupy the same 
position, only one person. So the limitation 
gives the opportunity to the people to control 
the performance of the president and the 
government in general (Interview, 2018).
Given that argument, the constitution 
has basically provided space for the people to 
be able to check and control the power of the 
president through general election. In addition, 
the constitution also provides an opportunity for 
everyone to be able to occupy political positions 
that are not monopolised by just one person or 
one group.
Constructing an Ideal Model of Periodisation 
in Indonesian Political System Responding 
to the Contemporary Development of 
Democratisation
It has been stated earlier that the existence 
of provisions in the constitution governing 
the periodisation of president’s power does 
not conflict with democracy, so it should also 
be reviewed here the appropriate model of 
periodisation responding to the development 
of democracy in Indonesia. Looking at various 
models of periodisation in various countries 
that adhere to presidential government system, 
we can find many references in determining 
this model. In the Philippines, South Korea and 
Paraguay, for instance, the president is only given 
the opportunity to serve for only one period. 
Indonesia and the US adhere to limitation on two 
periods. In Argentina and Brazil, the president 
can hold two periods, and then be re-elected 
for two periods after a grace period. Whereas 
in China, they recently remove the limitaton of 
two-period presidential term so the president can 
be run by a person without limits.
Likewise in Indonesia, even though the 
constitution has stipulated that presidential 
term is limited to only maximum two periods, 
many discourses to change this pattern are also 
voiced by academics or practitioners. Professor 
of Politics at the Indonesian Defense University, 
Salim Said, for instance, suggests that the laws 
governing the term of office of the Indonesian 
president need to be changed by promoting 
the idea that every person is only permitted to 
become a president once (Viva.co.id, 2018). This 
idea stands on the reason that the incumbents 
participating in the election will no longer use 
the excess facilities they have. Another opinion 
expressed by AM. Hendropriyono (Beritasatu.
com, 2018) who suggests that the president and 
vice president only serve one period, but his or 
her term of office was extended to eight years. 
The reason for the extension of the term of office 
is because, according to him, the effectiveness of 
the presidential position has only been running 
for four years, in which the last year of his or 
her period within the cheme of five years will be 
busy with elections. Another interesting opinion 
is conveyed by an Indonesian political scientist, 
Siti Zuhro (Okezone, 2018), who argues that the 
presidential term of office is very unlikely for 
more than two periods, as he or she should only 
serve in one period. Unless there is an interlude 
after one time period, the candidate can only 
advance for the second period. The incumbent 
factor which always tends to be stronger becomes 
the basis of that thinking.
If we highlight the various opinions above, 
it is very logical to consider that the presidential 
term of office in Indonesia is only limited to one 
period. The first reason is based on the existence 
of a conflict of interest between the incumbent 
and the organisers of the election, namely 
the General Election Commission (Komisi 
Pemilihan Umum or KPU). The conflict that has 
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been arising due to the political polarisation in 
2019 General Election recently also shows that 
presidential candidates from the incumbent, in 
nominating for the second time, could cause 
potential conflicts with the emergence of 
accusations of abuse of power coming from the 
challenger. Secondly, the reason is also drawn on 
the argument that incumbent participating in the 
election no longer uses the excess facilities he or 
she has and there are not candidates who always 
tend to be stronger than other. In relation to the 
length of one presidential term, Bagir Manan 
said that:
[In] many countries, [the length of] five 
years are generally accepted, as one of the 
administrative systems, especially in the 
economic field. In order not to misunderstand, 
we have an economic system that is usually 
[planned in every] five years, because if it is 
less than five years, it is too short and [if it 
is] more than five years [it] is too long. As 
someone said that the 25-year development 
is too long… because that year he or she 
will certainly not become a president again. 
Because the plans are to be run by a president, 
the five-year planning and implementation 
of the five years is considered as something 
rational, [hence] less than five years is too 
short, [and] more than five years is too long 
(Interview, 30 November 2018).
Another opinion that might be taken into 
consideration is the opinion of Siti Zuhro earlier 
who imposes a period of time for one term of 
office. This opinion according to the author is 
more logical compared to extending the term 
of office. In addition to reducing the problems 
related to the incumbent, a person’s right to 
remain a president is still open and it provides 
at the same time an alternative for the people to 
compare and elect the best president.
CONCLUSION
The periodisation of presidential term of office 
applies differently in several countries depending 
on their historical context and also socio-political 
relations. Different contexts give rise to modeling 
how accountability of the executive power is 
regulated. In Indonesia, in particular, the flow of 
liberal democratization that strengthened in 1998 
and the political trauma forced constitutional 
amendments, especially regarding the limitation 
of the presidential term, which in the previous 
order was not limited. However, this restriction 
still raises several interpretations and polemics 
regarding the possibility of re-election after two 
periods in office if there is an interlude by other 
president or vice president. The emergence of 
discourse on the re-nomination of Jusuf Kalla 
as a candidate of vice president in the 2019 
Presidential Election which emerged in early 
2018, for example, shows that Article 7 of 
the amended 1945 Constitution is still legally 
debated. Moreover, the limitation of the two 
periods that takes place now, in some ways, 
can reduce the performance of the president, 
especially in the second period where there is 
no more political ‘incentive’ for him to be re-
elected. This is exacerbated by the potential 
abuse of power for potential incumbents in 
facing the second-term general elections, making 
it difficult for potential challengers to be able to 
keep up with incumbents.
Based on the findings of the research, the 
constitution must still function as a political 
instrument to limit the power of the state with 
its citizens, so that limitation on executive 
power, in this case the president, must still be 
done to avoid the practice of absolute power. 
Furthermore, these restrictions must certainly 
consider several things, especially in the context 
of the implementation. First, the limitation of 
the presidential term of office must still provide 
a space for public accountability in the form of 
re-election for incumbents, which can be seen as 
a means of punishment and appreciation from 
citizens for the performance of their president 
during the first period. However, secondly, this 
re-election must also consider the potential for 
deviation and abuse of power by incumbents 
so that it is necessary to bring up a model that 
does not allow a president to actively participate 
in general elections simultaneously. Therefore, 
constitutional restrictions must continue to 
consider the president’s accountability and 
citizen satisfaction for the performance of the 
president while, at the same time, avoiding 
abuse of power conducted by incumbents in the 
election process for their second period.
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